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ABSTRACT1 
Functional testing of embedded processors is a 
challenging task and additional constraints are imposed 
when a functional test procedure has to be executed on-
line. In the latter case, a significant amount of the 
processor faults cannot be detected since related to the 
debug/test circuitry or because of memory configuration 
constraints. In this paper we identify several sources of 
on-line functional untestability and propose a set of 
techniques to exactly measure their impact on the fault 
coverage. Experimental results related to an industrial 
case study are reported, showing that the fault coverage 
loss due to the considered untestability sources may reach 
more than 13%. 
1. Introduction
Nowadays, being able to functionally test embedded 
microprocessors is a major concern for industry. While 
scan-based approaches are still dominating manufacturing 
test, functional testing is a recognized strategy to self-test 
embedded processors functionalities during their mission. 
By functional test we mean here a technique that aims at 
detecting possible faults by just acting on the functional 
inputs and observing the functional outputs of a processor, 
without resorting to any Design for Testability. Since a 
functional test is typically based on forcing the processor 
to execute a suitable test program, and then on observing 
the results the test program produced (e.g., in terms of 
memory content), processor functional test is also referred 
to as Software-Based Self-Test, or SBST [6].  
In the automotive sector, the self-test of the 
processor(s) included in an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) 
during the operational phase is mandated by the ISO 
26262 standard, which indicates three levels of confidence 
with respect to the safety of the car depending on the 
coverage figure. For very critical environments, such as 
airbags or drive-by-wire functions, the standard mandates 
for 98% of fault coverage. In such a scenario, it is crucial 
to distinguish untestable faults, so that they can be 
removed from the list of faults to be tested. Since 
functional test is a common solution for fulfilling the on-
line test requirements mandated by such regulations, better 
understanding and clearly identifying which faults cannot 
be tested following such solution is a major practical 
concern. 
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Several works already dealt with untestable faults, 
namely introducing structural and functional untestability 
and proposing techniques for their identification [1]; while 
many works focused on untestable faults in generic 
combinational and sequential circuits [2][3][4], only few 
specifically studied the sources of untestability in 
microprocessors [5][9]. The main issue in this case is that 
the identification of functionally untestable faults requires 
analyzing the behavior of all instructions and sequences of 
instructions, thus distinguishing the sequences of values 
that can be applied to the inputs of combinational blocks 
from those that cannot. In turn, a fault can be classified as 
functionally untestable if there is no sequence of 
instructions that can either excite it, or force it to produce 
visible effects, or both.    
In this paper we introduce and formally define on-line 
functionally untestable faults; they are faults related to  
• Hardware resources within the embedded processor
that are no longer used along the mission behavior, 
having been introduced for manufacturing test and 
debug, only 
• Address generation management, whereas the
allocated memory space is smaller than the maximum 
allowed size, or when some memory portions cannot 
be accessed freely during the in-field behavior. 
In particular, we focus on three sources of on-line 
functional untestability, related to: 
• Scan circuitries
• Debug circuitries
• Addressing resources.
In this paper we also describe a methodology for
practically identifying on-line functionally untestable 
faults: the method is mainly based on modifying the circuit 
for the purpose of untestable fault identification by 
connecting some carefully selected signals to fixed values; 
in this way on-line untestable faults are transformed into 
structurally untestable faults, and can thus be identified by 
the usual EDA tools. Results obtained using the proposed 
technique are quite significant: we observed about the 
13% of coverage lost due to on-line functionally 
untestable faults on an industrial system-on-chip for 
automotive including a 32-bit embedded microcontroller. 
The paper continues as following. Section 2 provides 
some background about the addressed issue. Section 3 
describes the key elements of the proposed strategy and 
then describes it in details. Section 4 shows the results 
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obtained on an industrial case study. Section 5 draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Background on Untestable Faults
According to the literature [1], an untestable fault is a 
fault for which no test exists. 
Untestable fault identification is often performed by 
starting from the combinational block each fault is located 
in. The first operation is typically the identification of 
those faults that, being related to some redundant logic, 
cannot be tested even if we had full access to the inputs 
and outputs of the combinational block. These faults are 
normally called structurally untestable faults. 
When dealing with processors, the possibility of 
testing those faults that are not structurally untestable 
strongly depends on the target fault model and on adopted 
test approach: for example, all structurally testable stuck-
at faults in a combinational block can be tested when 
resorting to a scan solution. Conversely, only a relatively 
small subset of structurally testable path delay faults can 
be tested resorting to a functional approach [5][7][9]. 
When processor-based systems are used in safety-
critical applications, it is often required to monitor their 
health by routinely performing some kind of test; while 
BIST solutions provide several advantages in this 
scenario, they require the system to be suitably designed 
and the BIST mechanism to be activated on field, possibly 
without significantly impacting on the system status. For 
these reasons an alternative solution is based of 
performing a functional test, based on forcing the 
processor to execute a test program and observing the 
produced results [8]. Specific target fault coverage figures 
must be achieved in both cases to fulfill safety-related 
constraints. 
In general, faults that cannot be tested resorting to the 
functional approach (i.e., for which no test program exists 
able to detect them) can be defined as functionally 
untestable.  
When following the functional approach, it is well 
known that a major obstacle lies in the generation of 
suitable test programs, able to reach the target fault 
coverage figure. Hence, it is crucial to be able to 
preliminarily identify functionally untestable faults, and 
prune them from the fault list, thus reducing the test 
program generation effort and improving the testable fault 
coverage figure. 
The scenario can be even further detailed when the 
functional approach is used for on-line testing: in this case 
significant limitations may exist in terms of accessible 
input and output signals. As an example, it may be 
impossible with a purely functional test program to 
activate the reset signal to the processor. Similarly, the 
output behavior of the processor cannot be fully observed 
in this scenario: as an example, a fault only producing a 
delay of some clock cycles in a specific memory access 
cannot be detected, since only the final content of some 
memory variables is typically checked at the end of the 
test program.  
As a result, we can state that when the functional 
approach is used for on-line test, some faults cannot be 
tested, even if they are functionally testable: we call these 
faults on-line functionally untestable. 
3. On-line Functionally Untestable fault
identification
When testing on-line a microprocessor-based system-
on-chip through functional approaches, it is usual that 
some resources used for design and silicon debug, and for 
manufacturing test are no more accessible. These 
structures can basically be classified into two groups: 
• Design for Testability circuitries controlled directly
on the boundary of the chip by a tester during
manufacturing test, including
o Scan chains
o Boundary scan and IEEE 1500 structures
o Built-in self-test modules
• Design for Debug units controlled by external
controllers during silicon and software debug, such as
Nexus-compliant modules.
The access ports of these modules are often soldered
to ground or Vdd, or pulled to a fixed logic value when the 
system is put in its mission field. This is sometimes done 
for security reasons, too, thus reducing the possibility to 
exploit these access points for supporting an illegal attack 
to the circuit.  
The direct consequence of such a final configuration 
of the system is the appearance of a further set of 
untestable faults that we call on-line untestable faults. 
Such faults are testable until the structures they are related 
to are used, but not in the final environment.  
ON-LINE FAULT UNIVERSE
ON-LINE DETECTABLE
ON-LINE FUNCTIONALLY 
UNTESTABLE
FUNCTIONALLY 
UNTESTABLE
STRUCTURALLY
UNTESTABLE
Fig. 1: On-line fault categories and their relationship. 
Figure 1 exemplifies this scenario; in the on-line fault 
universe, the on-line functionally untestable fault set is a 
superset of the functionally untestable faults. 
The main purpose of the paper is providing methods 
for the identification of such category of faults in the 
embedded processor. This task is not trivial, since in most 
cases the circuitries originating on-line untestabilities are 
deeply embedded in the processor functional modules. Our 
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identification process exploits the capabilities of 
conventional tools capable of tracing scan chains and 
distinguishing structurally untestable faults in 
combinational circuits. 
In the following sections, we will also discuss the 
functional untestabilities introduced by the mission 
configuration of the system; in simple words, it is usual to 
observe that some functionalities of the processor are not 
fully exercised. This is normally due to usage of generic 
modules in a specific configuration context, such as a 
memory map partially covering the potentially available 
memory space. 
3.1 Scan circuitries 
A set of on-line functionally untestable faults is 
related to the scan chain circuitries.  
Since the scan chain is no more used along the 
mission behavior, most of the faults potentially affecting it 
may not be considered anymore.  
Figure 2 shows a stuck-at mux scan flip flop: in the 
fault-free circuit, the serial input SI is never connected to 
the flip flop, which is always fed with the functional input 
FI. Supposing the scan enable SE signal to be forced to the 
logic value ‘1’ to make the scan chain working, the stuck-
at-0 fault on the SE signal is untestable. As well, stuck-at-
1 and stuck-at-0 on the SI signal are untestable.  
As a result of this analysis, it can be stated that the 
only fault that needs to be taken into consideration is the 
stuck-at-1 on SE; this fault can erroneously connect the SI 
signal to the flip flop, thus changing the mission behavior 
of the processor. 
C
QD
SE
SI
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0
1
S@0
S@1
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FI
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S@1
Fig. 2: mux scan structure and faults related to the scan behavior. 
Automatic identification of these faults can be done 
quite easily by using any EDA tool able to trace the scan 
chain. This means for any kind of flip flop reached by the 
trace operation, identifying the SI and SE signals, and then 
removing the stuck-at-1 and stuck-at-0 faults on the SI 
signal and the stuck-at-X fault on the SE signal, where X 
is the logic value for the selection of the functional mode 
(i.e., stuck-at-0 in the example). 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that buffers and 
inverters may exist on the scan path between flip flops; all 
faults concerning these buffers have also to be considered 
as on-line functionally untestable, analogously to the faults 
affecting SO in figure 2. 
3.2 Debug circuitries 
Debug circuitries are included in most of the available 
embedded processors. Such modules are mainly intended 
to observe and, eventually, manipulate registers content 
and to perform controlled execution (e.g., step by step, run 
until breakpoint, etc.) of a software application. 
As an example, the Nexus port is a popular debug 
infrastructure, which permits to observe and control the 
processor status by enabling an external debugger to 
access its structures. 
During the mission behavior, such an external 
debugger is not clearly connected to the system: therefore, 
there are circuitries no more used in the processor and 
generating on-line functionally untestable faults. Indeed, it 
is crucial to identify such faults when the objective is the 
achievement of the highest possible coverage.  
SoC
CPU
DEBUG
UNIT
External
Debug
controller
MEM
Degug
logic
Fig. 3: Debug components in a System-on-Chip. 
To the sake of clarity, we distinguish control abilities 
from observation capabilities related to the debug 
interface, and we provide a technique to quickly identify 
on-line functionally untestable faults for both cases. 
3.2.1 Untestable faults due to unused control logic 
The top level of the embedded microprocessor can be 
reached by signals devised to manage the processor 
functionalities during debug sections. Through these 
signals it is possible from an external equipment to 
monitor and even to manipulate the processor status.  
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DO S@0
S@1
Fig. 4: debug circuit configuration for enabling flip-flop 
manipulation. 
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As an example, a generic debug structure is shown in 
figure 4, with a Debug Enable signal (DE), enabling a 
value to be forced from the outside to replace the current 
flip flop value. During the on-line behavior, DE is no 
longer used since the external debugger is no more 
connected. Indeed, DE generates an on-line functionally 
untestable stuck-at-0, as well as the stuck-at-X faults of 
the Debug Input (DI) signal. 
To quickly identify the faults that are on-line 
functionally untestable, we resorted to a circuit 
manipulation followed by a structural untestability 
analysis. The procedure is composed of the following 
steps: 
1. connect to ground or Vdd (i.e., tied’0 or tied’1) all
CPU inputs related to debug and showing a constant
value
2. run any EDA tool able to identify structural untestable
faults
3. remove the identified faults from the fault list.
3.2.2 Untestable faults due to unused observation 
logic 
Similarly to unused control logic, also the signals 
devised to transport data from the processor to the external 
debug equipment are possible sources for on-line 
functionally untestable faults. 
As a matter of fact, the values on these signals are not 
read when in the in-field application environment. 
Therefore, all faults related to circuitries only devoted to 
carry values to the outside of the chip for debug purposes 
should be considered as on-line functionally untestable. 
In figure 4, the signal Debug Output (DO) is left 
floating when the debugger is disconnected, therefore the 
related faults do not affect the behavior of the chip. 
Again, we can resort to a circuit manipulation 
followed by a structural untestability analysis to identify 
this group of on-line functionally untestable faults:  
1. Unconnect (e.g., leave floating) all CPU outputs
related to debug
2. run any EDA tool able to identify structural untestable
faults
3. remove the identified faults from the fault list.
3.3 Memory map 
Another source of on-line untestability is related to 
the organization of the memory space. In fact, it is quite 
common to have only a part of the available addresses 
really accessible while a generic address management 
component is included in the System-on-Chip. 
Let us consider the following realistic scenario. A 
RAM and a flash memory, whose size is 1024x8 and 
4096x8 bits, respectively, are connected to a system bus 
with 32 bits used for addressing. In this case, the processor 
is potentially able to manage 232 addresses, but it is 
required to intervene only on a small subset of addresses; 
if the considered RAM and flash memory core are mapped 
one after the other, starting from address 0, then only 12 
bits of the address bus will really be used. 
Unused address bits originate logic gates stuck to a 
solid value along all the mission behavior; therefore, they 
are source of on-line functional untestability; as a matter 
of fact, during the in-field behavior it will not be possible 
to change the value of every address bit by executing 
instructions. 
The set of modules affected by this phenomenon 
includes address generation, prediction and virtualization 
units. Due to the memory address restriction, all registers 
used for storing addresses will always show a constant 
logic value (‘0’ in the proposed explanatory example) and 
logic gates used for address manipulation will be only 
partly used. 
In an address generation unit, for instance, it means 
that the inputs of the adder used in a branch address 
calculation are fed with some constant inputs, thus 
compromising the final coverage.  
In a prediction unit, many bits in the registers used to 
save a branch addresses are stuck to a value, and the same 
negative effect is shown by units for virtual memory 
management. 
To quickly identify the faults that are on-line 
functionally untestable, we resorted again to a circuit 
manipulation followed by a structural untestability 
analysis:  
4. connect to ground or Vdd (i.e., tied’0 or tied’1)
a. input and output of those flip flops showing a
constant value in any register involved in
address manipulation
b. input of the modules used to manipulate
addresses (i.e., adder for branch calculation)
5. run any CAD tool able to identify structural untestable
faults
6. remove the identified faults from the fault list.
Figure 5 graphically illustrates which faults will be
identified as untestable in a D flip-flop with active low 
reset whose value is constant to ‘0’. This example is 
falling in the case 1.a.  
C
QD
S@0
S@1
RST
S@0
S@1
S@0
S@1
S@0
S@1
Fig. 5: On-line functionally untestable faults in a DFF with active 
low reset whose value is constant to ‘0’.  
The structural analysis returns only 2 testable faults, 
stuck-at-1 on D and stuck-at-1 on Q. If this is a flip flop in 
a register storing an address for any reason, an error will 
propagate in the system and produce an exception. 
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In our solution to identify on-line untestable faults, we 
also connect the output of the flip flop to tied values. This 
action permits to propagate a tied value to the logic gates 
connected to the flip flop in case the used tool stops the 
untestable identification process at flip flops.  
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the working principle 
of the technique. When forcing a tied value to a net, i.e., 
driven by a flip flop with on-line constant value, structural 
untestable faults are identified by just looking at the 
structural properties of the connected circuit portion. 
0/1
0/1
C0
ADDRESS-related
register
S@0
S@1
S@0
S@1
Fig. 6: On-line functionally untestable faults in a DFF with active 
low reset whose value is constant to ‘0’. 
Similarly, any circuitry used for address manipulation has 
to be investigated; for instance, some of the inputs of the 
adder used for address generation may be forced to tied 
values, thus allowing the identification of untestable faults.  
4. An industrial case study
We experimentally evaluated the proposed strategy on 
a commercial System-on-Chip including a processor with 
32-bits address and data parallelism. This activity was 
performed in a larger context; in particular, it is part of the 
effort devised to work out a software-based self-test 
library with high fault coverage capabilities. In fact, since 
the chip is employed in the automotive field (e.g., for the 
airbag control), it has to cope with the ISO 26262 
standard. From this point of view, it is fundamental to 
screen out any on-line functionally untestable faults since 
the coverage requirement is quite strict. 
The proposed strategy was applied when the self-test 
suite of functional programs was already quite mature. As 
it will be better described later in this paragraph, the 
identification of on-line untestable faults permitted to raise 
by about 13% the stuck-at fault coverage.  
We set up a flow corresponding to the procedures 
described in section 3, composed of several phases and 
adopting several commercial and ad-hoc CAD tools. To 
summarize and generalize, we identified three major 
activities able to effectively lead us to a secure and low 
resource consuming result: 
1) Search for sources of untestability
2) Circuit manipulation (possible)
3) Screen out on-line functionally untestable faults
through
a. Direct pruning from the fault list
b. Structural untestability checking.
The considered embedded processor is equipped with 
dedicated test and debug circuitries. It is fully scannable, 
with mux-Dff composing several scan-chains. It is 
connected with a Nexus-compliant module enabling 
general and special purpose register manipulation, as well 
as memory data control. Furthermore, it supports a 32 bits 
address bus connecting two memory cores, a 128K SRAM 
and a 512K Flash. 
The embedded processor core totally accounts for 
214,930 stuck-at faults. 
The first task was dealing with on-line untestable 
faults due to the scan chain. In this case, we first 
investigated the nature of the used scan flip flops by doing 
some experiments using Tetramax. The main purpose of 
the experiments was to verify the assumptions regarding 
untestable faults resulting from a constant SE value; we 
then tied the SE signal to a fixed value and observed the 
result from Tetramax; on-line untestable faults are 
classified as “untestable due to tied value - UT” by the 
tool.  
Then, with the list of faults to be safely removed from 
each scan-ff fault list, we used an ad-hoc tool able to trace 
the chain and directly select the on-line functionally 
untestable faults.  
As a result we pruned about 20K stuck-at faults, 
corresponding to about 9% of the total of faults. 
We then considered the debug circuitries. Coherently 
with the distinction between untestable faults due to 
unused control and observation logic, discussed in 
paragraph 3.2, we devised two strategies. 
To prune faults related to unused control logic, we 
resorted to a preliminary analysis based on high-level code 
coverage metrics. It is quite usual to exploit these metrics, 
such as toggle, switching and condition coverage, to have 
an idea of which parts of the circuit are used and which are 
not (this is normally reflecting in a localized low 
coverage). Since working on a quite mature self-test 
program suite, any signal still showing no activity was 
identified as suspect. In particular, we first concentrated 
our investigation on the inputs of the CPU, then on its 
control and data-path blocks. 
The result has been the selection of 17 signals, related 
to the debug functionalities driven by a Nexus unit 
collocated outside the processor core or directly by ports 
of the chip. They include an entire JTAG access port and 
several control signals used to manage the processor 
behavior when the chip is connected to an external host 
PC for debug purpose. 
We proceeded to circuit manipulation by tying these 
signals to fixed values. The manipulated circuit was finally 
fed to Tetramax, which identified a significant number of 
Untestable Faults. In particular, we identified 4,548 on-
line functionally untestable faults. 
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 To remove faults related to unused observation logic 
we first looked at the boundary of the CPU for signals 
neither explicitly (e.g., being part of the system bus) or 
implicitly (e.g., provoking a system reaction) participating 
to the system behavior. This is the usual case for debug 
signals carrying out processor state information (i.e., the 
registers content).  
Since the evaluation of the fault coverage of a self-test 
program procedure is obtained by only observing the 
system bus, we modified the circuit by disconnecting two 
32-bits busses directly providing general and special 
purpose register values to be only captured along debug 
sessions. 
The obtained circuit was finally analyzed with 
Synopsys Tetramax: the produced fault list is smaller than 
the one produced for the original circuit. The removed 
faults, 2,357 stuck-at faults, are corresponding to on-line 
functionally untestable faults due to reduced observability. 
As a last source of investigation, we looked for the 
memory space organization. Since the e200z0 is 
implementing a 32 bits address bus while connecting two 
memory cores, a 512K SRAM and a 512K Flash, it has to 
be deduced which address bits could never move. Let us 
consider that:  
• Flash address range is 0x0007_8000 to 0x0007_FFFF
• RAM address range is 0x4000_0000 to 0x4001_FFFF
This configuration implies that only the 18 less significant 
bits and the 30th bit can assume legally both ‘0’ and ‘1’. 
Circuit manipulation was applied for connecting to 
ground the unused bits of all register in the address 
generation unit, including those belonging to the Branch 
Target Buffer module. 
Tetramax analysis brought out 3,610 structurally 
untestable faults.  
Table I: summary of the identified on-line functionally 
untestable faults 
On-line functionally untestable faults 
[#] [%]
Original 0 0 
Scan 19,142 8.9% 
Debug 4,548+2,357 3.2%
Memory 3,610 1.7% 
TOTAL 29,657 13.8% 
Table I summarizes the overall result achieved. The 
coverage loss due to the identified sources of on-line 
functional untestability was 13.8% of the entire fault list. 
A relevant aspect that needs to be underlined is related to 
the time required to complete this analysis. From the 
human cost point of view, it required a skilled test 
engineer to identify untestability sources; this operation 
was accomplished in about 1 week some days of work. 
From the CPU time point of view, the modified circuit is 
analyzed by Tetramax in less than 1 second. 
5. Conclusions
When testing on-line a processor-based system using a 
functional approach, techniques to identify faults for 
which no test program exists may allow to significantly 
reduce the effort for test program generation and to better 
evaluate the achieved fault coverage. 
This paper contribution is two-fold: from one side it 
introduces the definition of on-line functionally untestable 
faults, reporting some examples of this category of faults; 
from the other, it proposes some techniques to make their 
identification feasible in industrial practice, i.e., by 
resorting to commercial EDA tools. Some experimental 
results related to a real processor core are also reported, 
showing both that the number of on-line functionally 
untestable faults is not negligible (about 13% of the total 
stuck-at fault list) and that their identification is practically 
feasible. 
We are currently working to extend the proposed 
technique to other fault models.   
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